Understanding the mechanisms at the origin of cooperation is a major challenge to Darwin's natural selection theory [1] : If only the fittest individuals survive, how to explain the ubiquity of cooperation? Among many examples of altruistic behaviors, one can mention insects that coordinate their efforts for the benefit of their "queen" [2] .
Understanding the mechanisms at the origin of cooperation is a major challenge to Darwin's natural selection theory [1] : If only the fittest individuals survive, how to explain the ubiquity of cooperation? Among many examples of altruistic behaviors, one can mention insects that coordinate their efforts for the benefit of their "queen" [2] .
In this context, Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), see e.g. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , provides a suitable framework to address this question by means of parsimonious models in which each agent's reproductive potential (expected payoff or fitness) depends on the others' fitness. In infinitely large populations, the frequency of the competing species/strategies evolves according to the underlying "replicator (nonlinear differential) equations". In such a mean field setting, the evolutionary stable strategies of symmetric two-strategy games can readily be found in terms of two parameters directly obtained by rescaling the entries of the payoff matrix. In what follows, we will refer to this operation as the "replicator parametrization". Interestingly, the fitness optimization at an individual level may cause the reduction of the population's average fitness yielding a "social dilemma", as in the celebrated two-strategy prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift and stag-hunt games [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . At mean field level, these cooperation dilemmas can easily and comprehensively be analyzed by using the replicator parametrization. However, when the size of the population is finite, stochastic effects play an important role and the notion of evolutionary stability needs to be refined: In the simple case of two-strategy games, a strategy is evolutionary stable (ESS N ) in a well-mixed finite population if it has a higher fitness than the alternative strategy, and if a single player adopting the mutant-strategy has a lower fixation probability than in the absence of selection. The latter condition accounts for the selection to oppose the replacement by the alternative strategy [9] . Due to these two conditions, whether a strategy is an ESS N cannot be inferred by simply rescaling the payoff matrix and a comprehensive analysis of the dilemmas can no longer be carried out by using only the replicator parametrization.
In their review article [10] , Wang et al. propose to describe the classical two-player social dilemmas in terms of a new set of parameters obtained by generalizing the approach used in Ref. [8] for the so-called donor-and-recipient prisoner's dilemma game. By focusing chiefly on the case of well-mixed finite populations, the authors of Ref. [10] show that the parametrization that they put forward is both a natural and efficient choice to analyze the properties of symmetric two-player games. Wang et al. make their point by revisiting five popular reciprocity mechanisms [8] and the necessary replacement condition for a strategy to be an ESS N under weak selection [9] . They show that their new parametrization allows them to re-derive non-trivial results in a simple and general manner, and is therefore superior to the replicator parametrization. As a further application, Wang et al. also demonstrate that the use of their set of parameters enables them to resolve an apparent paradox in some two-strategy games with positive assortment [11] . Moreover, Wang et al. present a series of numerical investigations on various topologies indicating that the parametrization that they introduce is also particularly suited to describe the properties of social dilemmas in spatial settings.
In addition to what the authors of [10] have outlined in their interesting review article, the following open questions may also be considered for possible future research: (i) Is there a natural generalization of the proposed parametrization for games with more than two pure strategies, and/or for asymmetric games? (ii) Can the proposed parametrization help to reveal in a simple and transparent way what are the conditions for a strategy to be an ESS N under selection of arbitrary strength? (iii) Would the proposed parametrization help to describe the properties of cooperation dilemmas in the presence of "facilitators" or "zealots" considered in Refs. [12] [13] [14] ?
